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I show some problems with recent discussions within qualitative research that 
centre around the “authenticity” of phenomenological research methods. I argue 
that attempts to restrict the scope of the term “phenomenology” via reference to 
the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl are misguided, because the 
meaning of the term “phenomenology” is only broadly restricted by etymology. 
My argument has two prongs: first, via a discussion of Husserl, I show that the 
canonical phenomenological tradition gives rise to many traits of contemporary 
qualitative phenomenological theory that are purportedly insufficiently genuine 
(such as characterisations of phenomenology as “what-its-likeness” and 
presuppositionless description). Second, I argue that it is not adherence to the 
theories and methods of prior practitioners such as Husserl that justifies the 
moniker “phenomenology” anyway. Thus, I show that the extent to which 
qualitative researchers ought to engage with the theory of philosophical 
phenomenology or adhere to a particular edict of Husserlian methodology ought 
to be determined by the fit between subject matter and methodology and 
conclude that qualitative research methods still qualify as phenomenological if 
they develop their own set of theoretical terms, traditions, and methods instead 
of importing them from philosophical phenomenology. 
 
Keywords: phenomenology, qualitative research, philosophical 
phenomenology, qualitative phenomenological methods, what-its-like, 
description, presuppositions, bias, phenomenological interview, open or semi-





The present article is motivated by discussions concerning the meaning of the term 
“phenomenology.” What all these discussions have in common is that they assume a univocal 
or essentialist perspective on meaning: there must be some distinguishing trait, or some 
necessary and sufficient conditions, which regulates when we should and shouldn’t apply the 
term “phenomenology.” 
 The thesis I will put forward in this article is that there is only an extremely broad 
univocal meaning of the term “phenomenology,” and then a series of family resemblances. 
Some ways the term is used resemble others. Just as there are patterns and distinguishing traits 
of the family members yet no one precise or exact distinguishing quality. Moreover, this 
situation is quite unproblematic. The biggest threat comes not from the fact that there is 
divergence in definitions but from arguments which trade on equivocality. The important 
project is thus not to prove that one sense is more authentic than the others, but to clearly 
distinguish these different senses so we can avoid ambiguity.    
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Some (perhaps not all) words take on different senses because they are used by a 
community in a certain way. A class of terms for which this definitely applies is cultural 
products, of which academic disciplines are a type. Other nonessential meanings are terms 
which denote aesthetic trends, like “baroque” or “postmodern.” Admittedly, we cannot just 
begin to use a word in a completely unconnected and foreign way, but the only regulation is 
that our emergent meaning falls under a broad umbrella and shares some sort of genetic heritage 
with prior use. In this way, there will be some often-vague connection amongst meanings that 
preserves the coherence of language. Some traits must be shared between members of a family, 
but with cultural products in particular, there can be no regulating which traits are the 
“essential” ones, because meaning in this case is a hermeneutic activity, and the most we can 
establish is that a current sense has shifted from an original one. Meaning is here loosely 
regulated.  
The purposes of this article are threefold. Firstly, it will interrogate some of the current 
proposals that there is some particular trait or condition which is the one which ought to 
distinguish the real sense of the term “phenomenology” and dismiss them. In particular I will 
critique the proposal that a discipline must draw on certain traits of Husserlian or philosophical 
phenomenology in order to qualify as phenomenological. Secondly, to make explicit some of 
the genetic traits which qualitative phenomenologies are drawing on and, finally, evaluate these 
traits.  
Section 2 shows that an etymological approach to the meaning of the term 
“phenomenology” leaves us with a very wide definition, but the only one I think we ought to 
accept. Section 3 raises the objection that it is adherence to philosophical phenomenology of 
Edmund Husserl which defines when one ought to deem a discipline “phenomenological.” This 
section also outlines the approach I will employ throughout this article to refuting this 
objection. The remaining sections delve into and analyze the spots within contemporary 




A common approach to defining the meaning of a word is to look at its etymology. An 
etymological approach to meaning, outlined below, suggests that “phenomenology” is the 
study of that which can be experienced. If one is looking for a definition, I would settle for this 
one, and I think all the different meanings of the term “phenomenology” must cohere with this 
one. However, this definition is so wide it does not rule out any of the various uses of the term 
we find in the current literature, because the meaning of the root terms “phenomena” and 
“logos” are vague.  
The word “phenomenon” derives from the Greek words “phainein” meaning “bring to 
light” and “phainesthai” meaning “to appear.” It also directly derives from the late Latin word 
“phænomenon,” which is also from the Greek “phainomenon” meaning “that which appears.” 
Generally, a phenomenon is anything that can be experienced in some sort of way. “Logos” 
too, has an ancient Greek origin. Its ancient formulation is one of the most notoriously 
ambiguous words, meaning potentially “correspondence,” “proportion,” “explanation,” “law,” 
“rule of conduct,” “thesis,” “hypothesis,” “reason,” “ground,” “inward debate of the soul,” 
“narrative,” “oration,” and “verbal expression or utterance” (Liddell & Scott, 1940).  
“Logos” means thought or discourse about a subject. It could be descriptive, natural 
scientific, dialectic, analytic, or aesthetic. All of these have been considered types of “study” 
or “science.” One might think of Proust’s In Search of Lost Time as a logos of memory, of the 
sketches an artist makes as a logos of their subject, of Hegel’s philosophy as a logos of spirit, 
or of quantum physics as a logos of matter. If you want to define “phenomenology” as any sort 
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of logos about any sort of phenomena, then you have a very wide definition indeed. And this 
is as far as the etymological approach will get you.  
It might of course be argued that the founders of phenomenology had a very specific 
type of logos about a very specific type of phenomena in mind, and I would agree. However, 
this is a different, non-etymological criterion for regulating when a term applies, and one which 
I spend the rest of this article arguing against. 
   
§3 Coining terms 
 
The other common approach is to turn to the definition of the term provided by the 
person who coined it. It is difficult to determine who coined the term “phenomenology”; the 
earliest recorded usage of the German term Phänomenologie is by Johann Heinrich Lambert in 
1764. In the philosophical context, the earliest usage of the term is not Husserl, of course, but 
Hegel. I suspect that if we took Hegel’s definition as the one true meaning, then all the 
canonical phenomenologies (including Husserl’s) would be off the table. Charitably urges one 
to leave this small problem to the side. Perhaps, instead, it would be more appropriate to look 
to the work of the person whose influential work established the currently dominant tradition 
of phenomenology, and of course in this case we mean Husserl.  
As I will show, a common tactic amongst Husserlian phenomenological theorists (even 
those in the field of qualitative research) is to argue that their opponents do not stay faithful to 
the spirit of Husserl’s phenomenology. I have two main responses to this tactic. The first is to 
point out that we can find prima facie evidence for the validity of many approaches to 
phenomenology within the primary Husserlian literature. Husserl was a very exploratory 
author, and his corpus gives rise to more of the genetic traits of his descendants than other 
members of the family are often willing to admit.  
My second response is to point out that, even Husserl has no propriety right over the 
meaning of the term “phenomenology.” My argument here is one of analogy–we do not look 
to the foundational fathers of a discipline to regulate the meaning of a term and provide a 
definition of a field of study. To show that one is not doing phenomenology as Husserl 
conceived it is analogous to showing that one is not doing natural science as Newton conceived 
it, sociology as Durkheim conceived it, or psychology as Wundt conceived it. Adherence to 
any single author’s ideas or method is not what licenses one to use any academic label. I will 
employ both types of response throughout this article.  
           
§4 The minimal conditions of genuine phenomenology 
 
There is an ongoing controversy concerning the authenticity of qualitative research 
methods which claim to be phenomenological (in order, the series of recent exchanges have 
been between van Manen 2017; Smith 2018; van Manen 2018; Zahavi 2018; van Manen 2019; 
Zahavi 2019b; Zahavi & Martiny 2019a; Zahavi 2019a; Morley 2019; Zahavi & Martiny 
2019b). A small sample of earlier exchanges include Giorgi 2008; Morley 2010). The key claim 
under dispute is that: 
 
…not all qualitative research inspired by phenomenology is phenomenology… 
It should be acknowledged that the various qualitative research methods that are 
inspired by phenomenology may be undeniably important and relevant and yet 
are not to be confused with genuine phenomenological methods and 
phenomenological research approaches. (van Manen, 2017, p. 777, my italics) 
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This debate has brought to light two criteria that, some contend, fail to satisfy the 
minimal conditions of phenomenology. Firstly, the characterisation of phenomenology as 
“what-it’s-likeness” and, secondly, singular and simple descriptions of lived experience. These 
two criteria are very much interrelated. As I shall now explain, when we attempt to describe 
what an experience is like, what results is a simple description of lived experience. 
 
§4.1 The origin of the association between “what experience is like” and phenomenology, 
and the connection with simple descriptions of experience 
 
I will begin with a very brief discussion of the origin of the connection between the 
phrase “what-it’s-like” and “phenomenology.” It is mostly authors in the so-called “analytic 
tradition” of philosophy that define phenomenology as “what-it’s-likeness” (often to the 
general annoyance of everyone working in the Continental tradition). Thomas Nagel coined 
the phrase “what-it’s-like” in an influential article termed What Is It Like To Be A Bat? and he 
explicitly draws a connection between what it is like to undergo experiences and 
“phenomenology” (Nagel, 1974, p. 220). A recent, explicit example is when self-professed 
analytic philosopher Michelle Montague writes that phenomenology “can be characterized in 
a familiar way as the phenomenon of there being ‘something it is like’ experientially, to be in 
a mental state, something it is like, experientially, for the creature who is in the state” 
(Montague, 2016, p. 8). Such examples are rife within analytic philosophy of mind.  
So, what does it mean to say that phenomenology is concerned with questions about 
“what-it-is-like”? David Chalmers, in perhaps the most influential book on consciousness in 
the Anglophone world in the twentieth century, states that “phenomenology” is synonymous 
with “experience” and “what-it-is-likeness” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 6), and then provides an 
example of an experience that there is something like to have: “In my environment now, there 
is a particularly rich shade of deep purple from a book upon my shelf” (ibid). Thus, when we 
verbalize what an experience is like, we get a simple and singular first-person description, 
paradigmatically (but not necessarily) of a qualitative state of sensation. 
  
4.2 Qualitative research, the characterisation of phenomenology as what-it’s-like, and 
simple descriptions of lived experience 
 
Within qualitative research, there are a variety of understandings of the term 
“phenomenology.” As Crotty discusses, there is a critical epistemological interpretation that 
engages in the reevaluation of conceptual frameworks; or there are more non-critical 
understandings of phenomenology (Crotty, 1998). Crotty’s introduction also denotes that 
“phenomenology” can be understood as both a theoretical perspective and a research 
methodology. Another distinction is that between descriptive and interpretive varieties of 
qualitative phenomenological research (Matua & Van Der Wal, 2015).  
More recently, it seems as if the characterisation of phenomenology as concerned with 
what experiences are like is now sometimes utilized by qualitative researchers putatively 
working within the phenomenological theoretical standpoint. It is common to frame qualitative 
phenomenological research methodology in terms of uncovering “what experiences are like.” 
Another way to frame what is at stake here, drawing on the distinction found in the introduction 
to Crotty (1998), is that one way to characterize the theoretical standpoint of phenomenology 
is as concerned with “what-experiences-are-like,” and once this characterisation of this 
standpoint is adopted in a qualitative context then the methodological approach which follows 
is one where the researcher relies heavily on simple descriptions of an individual’s experience, 
as such descriptions purportedly convey what experience is like.   
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For example, a recent introductory text states that qualitative phenomenological 
research questions are phrased by asking “What is it like to…” (Vagle, 2018, p. 218). Smith, 
Flowers, and Larkin’s 2009 textbook on the qualitative research method of Interpretive 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) states that the IPA researcher wants to “see what it is like 
from the participant’s view” and involves “trying to see what it is like for someone” (p. 37) to 
undergo different experiences. They urge the qualitative researcher to bear in mind they are 
“trying, as far as possible, to allow the participant to tell you what it is like to live in their 
personal world” (p. 63), and that a detailed IPA case study assists “in helping to understand 
what it is like to have a major personal experience” (p. 128).  
Van Manen, whose prolific authorship includes another well-known introduction to 
qualitative phenomenological methods (van Manen, 2016a), thinks that classic 
phenomenological philosophical accounts can all be characterised as attempts to answer the 
question of what different sorts of experiences are like. A “phenomenologically generic form” 
of inquiry asks, van Manen thinks, “What is this lived experience like?” “What is it like to 
experience this phenomenon or event?” (van Manen, 2017, p. 776). Highlighting the 
connection between simple or lived experience, what-it-is-like, and phenomenological 
qualitative research, van Manen writes that to do his type of qualitative “phenomenological 
research is to question something phenomenologically and, also, to be addressed by the 
question of what something is “really” like. What is the nature of this lived experience?” (van 
Manen, 2016b, p. 42).  
So, to dub a simple, singular description of lived experience “phenomenological” is to 
characterize phenomenology in a certain way and reinforce a conception of phenomenology as 
concerned with what experience is like. I take it as obvious that such descriptions of lived 
experience are commonplace within most varieties of phenomenologically orientated 
qualitative research studies. Just one example taken from the aforementioned Smith, Flowers, 
and Larkin textbook is the following description of what it is like to undergo dialysis: 
   
It’s sort of intrusive ‘cos it’s got these sharp needles of the thing that attaches 
you to it. With the needling it can be quite painful and it’s yeah that intrusion of 
metal into a very soft part of yourself. (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009, p. 126) 
 
4.3 The inadequacy of “what-it’s-like”  
 
Now that I have explicated the connection between what-it-is-likeness, qualitative 
phenomenological research, and simple descriptions of lived experience, let me turn to some 
objections to this cluster of concepts. What ought to be mentioned is that the connection of 
“what-it’s-likeness” with phenomenology is not really at home within the Continental 
phenomenological tradition, stemming as this connection does from within analytic 
philosophy, and Zahavi, for example, attempts to articulate additional conditions which a 
description must meet to qualify as phenomenological in the more traditional Husserlian 
Continental philosophical sense.  
A basic objection is that the “what-it’s-like” characterisation of phenomenology is 
inadequate. Zahavi stresses that phenomenology has far greater philosophical concerns than 
merely describing what different experiences are like. He argues that the phenomenological 
tradition appreciates the significance of being able to experience and verbalise conscious life, 
but “amassing experiential descriptions is a poor substitute for the systematic and 
argumentative work of phenomenological philosophers like Husserl” (Zahavi, 2017, p. 27). 
According to this objection, reference to experience is perhaps a necessary condition of 
phenomenological work (after all, phenomenology cannot study something that there’s nothing 
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that it’s like to experience)1 but it is insufficient, and it seems some systematic and 
argumentative analysis is further required.  
To put a similar point in Husserlian terms, these sorts of low-level descriptions appeal 
to a level of simple, singular “intuition.”2 But Husserl was quite adamant that these sorts of 
descriptions could not constitute the sort of science he envisaged for phenomenology. Husserl 
thinks that, once we limit our investigation to the phenomenal or experiential realm, we are not 
permitted to make knowledge claims about our experience of phenomenally appearing 
individuals like qualia, because we have no points of reference available to us (i.e., we have no 
way to objectively compare one phenomenal individual with another or locate it in conceptual 
space; Husserl, 2008, p. 220). We cannot say, for example, that this blue is bluer than a previous 
one or bluer than your blue. In the phenomenological sphere, individuals do not “stay put” for 
the purpose of objective comparison in the same way that individuals do in the natural world 
(ibid, p. 219).  
 
§4.4 A further condition–essential/eidetic research 
 
Husserl concludes that we must apprehend or take the phenomenal appearances as 
instantiations of universal structures, or in other words, as possessing essences (such as “color 
in general,” “sound in general”; Husserl, 2008, p. 222). Only by moving from the realm of 
singular to general or preferably universal intuition through an act termed Wesensshau 
(literally, the “seeing” of essential structures) can we begin to establish a scientific approach to 
experience (Husserl, 1977, section 9). For Husserl, phenomenology is eidetic. Giorgi holds this 
position too: 
 
If one does not employ the eidetic reduction and arrive at an essence or some 
other type of eidetic invariant concerning the concrete, detailed description of 
an experienced phenomenon by one or several participants, proper 
phenomenological procedures have not been followed. (Giorgi, 2008, p. 4, my 
italics) 
 
So, building on the objection that it is poor depiction of the discipline, there are a few 
variations on the conditions which phenomenologists apply to the thesis that phenomenology 
is the description of what experience is like. Husserl and Giorgi argue that phenomenology was 
essentially eidetic and interested not in singular experiences but universal structures. One gets 
the impression from the above quote and Zahavi’s recent exchanges (Zahavi, 2018, p. 900) that 
another condition seems to be that singular descriptions must be incorporated within a 
philosophical phenomenological framework, even those descriptions arising from qualitative 
research. I address the basic rejection of the characterisation of phenomenology as what-it’s-
likeness immediately below (§5.1), and then the addition of the condition of ideation from §5.2-
§5.4. The extent to which qualitative phenomenological research must draw on 








1 Though, see Steinbock (2017). 
2 I am using this term in the philosophical sense that Kant did.  
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§5 Responses and commentary 
 
§5.1 Response to the objection that the “what-it’s-like” characterisation of 
phenomenology is inadequate 
 
So, I have explicated the connection between what-it’s-likeness, phenomenology, and 
qualitative research in terms of the provision of descriptions of lived experience, and then 
voiced some objections to these connections. I will now address the objections, beginning with 
the claim that the ‘what-it’s-like’ characterisation of phenomenology, which we saw stemmed 
from analytic philosophy and has been drawn on by qualitative researchers, is inadequate. My 
response is that the analytic tradition and qualitative researchers are not unjustified in using the 
term “phenomenology” this way, because descriptions of what experience is like are indeed a 
legitimate trait of even of Continental philosophical phenomenology. 
Let me start with a few contemporary phenomenological researchers from other fields 
to show that it is not only analytic philosophers and qualitative researchers who think of 
phenomenology as the verbalization of what experience is like. Contemporarily, well-known 
cognitive scientist and phenomenological scholar Shaun Gallagher intimates that, when a 
patient in a waiting room reports “I have a headache and blindness in one eye,” then the patient 
is doing phenomenology (Gallagher, 2012, p. 203). Similarly, the eminent Husserl scholar D. 
W. Smith claims that an elementary form of phenomenological practice is providing reports 
like, “I see that fishing boat on the edge of the fog bank,” or “I desire a warm cup of green tea” 
(D. W. Smith, 2006, p. 163). Such first-person reports are straight-forwardly the verbalization 
of what our everyday experiences are like. 
Moreover, these low-level experiential descriptions can be found within the canonical 
phenomenological philosophical tradition as well.  
Husserl writes:   
 
I speak, e.g., of my inkpot, and my inkpot also stands before me: I see it 
(Husserl, 2001b, p. 201). While taking an evening stroll on the Loretto Heights 
a string of lights in the Rhine valley suddenly flashes in our horizon (Husserl, 
2001c, p. 202). Let us suppose that in a garden we regard with pleasure a 
blossoming apple tree, the freshly green grass of the lawn, etc. (Husserl, 1983, 
p. 214).  Wandering about in the Panopticum Waxworks we meet on the stairs 
a charming lady whom we do not know and who seems to know us, and who is 
in fact the well-known joke of the place: we have for a moment been tricked by 
a waxwork figure. (Husserl, 2001b, pp. 137-138) 
 
Let us imagine that moved by jealousy, curiosity, or vice I have just glued my 
ear to the door and looked through a keyhole… But all of a sudden, I hear 
footsteps in the hall. Someone is looking at me! (Sartre, 1992, pp. 259-260) 
 
Many from the phenomenological tradition see the characterisation of phenomenology 
as what-it’s-likeness as an oversimplification. Zahavi states that this characterisation has “little 
to do with phenomenology understood as a specific method or tradition in philosophy” (Zahavi, 
2018, p. 901). However, the provision of first-person descriptions of experience has an awful 
lot to do with phenomenological philosophy, and so we should not be so defensive. As the 
quotes I have just provided show, there’s a good reason why phenomenology can be 
characterized as either concerned with the phenomenal character of experience, or the provision 
of descriptions of what various experiences are like: because, at times, it is! What this 
defensiveness fails to face up to is that even Husserlian phenomenology often refers to first-
Heath Williams                                     373 
person experience disclosed via singular descriptions. It thus shares this genetic trait with its 
contemporary descendants, and it is this trait which qualitative disciplines concerned with what 
experience is like are calling on when they call themselves “phenomenological.” 
Instead of trying to disqualify disciplines which share this trait, the better tactic is to 
delineate the nature, function, virtues, and pitfalls of these descriptions (see §5.3–§6). 
  
§5.2 Addressing the objection over additional conditions 
 
So, let me now turn to the claim that there are additional conditions which 
phenomenological methods must fulfil to qualify as truly phenomenological. What is certainly 
the case is that Husserl supported this thesis. Though Husserl often provided singular 
descriptions of what experience is like, he also thought that phenomenology must additionally 
articulate laws about essences: “scientific-phenomenological investigation is aimed at general 
essences and laws of essence” (Husserl, 1977, pp. 35-36; see also Husserl, 1983, p. 324; 2001c, 
p. 624; 2008, p. 226). Giorgi is as a matter of fact quite explicit in acknowledging that he in 
turn adopted the methodological operation of ideation largely due to the influence Husserl has 
had on his thought (Giorgi, 2008). Yet, it serves us well to ask why Husserl sought to uncover 
phenomenological laws via the operation of ideation.  
Husserl is an author of great ambiguity. On the one hand, he founded a tradition which 
radically criticises the very roots and value of the positivistic scientific enterprise. On the other, 
the way he describes the nature, role, and place of phenomenology is often largely concomitant 
with the very picture of scientific traditionalism. One reasons for Husserl’s essentialist 
ambitions are that he has in mind, first, a traditional nomological vision of science. Husserl 
thinks that, to be afforded a place amongst the scientific nexus, phenomenology must engage 
in the formulation of laws, and this can only obviously be done by ascending up from the level 
of singular experience to the more general, essential level (Husserl, 1977, pp. 35-36; 1983, p. 
324; 2001c, p. 624; 2008, p. 226).  
Second, Husserl has a classical foundational vision of phenomenology’s place within 
the scientific nexus. He thought that by laying out the lawful relations amongst the types of 
structures of consciousness which give rise to any form of knowledge whatsoever, 
phenomenology lays out the grounds for all scientific endeavors (Husserl, 1999, 2001a, 2008, 
2019). These laws only flow from eidetic analysis, and so Husserl’s contention that 
phenomenology must move to the eidetic level results from his vision for phenomenology as a 
type of metascience. So, even though Giorgi for example is not motivated by foundationalist 
concerns, the source for his inherited eidetic methodology is.   
Contemporarily we have good reasons to be skeptical of Husserl’s nomological, 
foundationalist proclivities. None of the phenomenologists who followed continued this vision 
of founding natural science on phenomenology. Moreover, the foundationalist vision of 
empirical science has been challenged by the anti-foundationalism which pervaded philosophy 
of science in the latter half of the 20th century, thanks largely to the likes of Quine (1969, 1951, 
1970), Kuhn (1962), Sellars (1963), and Feyerabend (1975). Moreover, the nomological nature 
of science–especially human sciences–is by no means given, and qualitative research in 
particular rejects the idea that science ought only or even primarily to be in the business of 
articulating laws.   
If empirical science does not require a foundation, and the human sciences need not 
aspire to the articulation of laws, then there is no need for phenomenology to aspire to be a 
nomological metascience. Such aspirations are inextricably linked to Husserl’s attempts to 
institute eidetic analysis, and Husserl is the source of contemporary authors who claim that any 
non-eidetic method is not phenomenological. The picture we have of the scientific nexus and 
the place that phenomenology has within it have all undergone a radical revision since 
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Husserl’s time, and so therefore can the methodology of qualitative phenomenological 
research. 
  
§5.3 The value of the description of simple lived experience 
 
And so, if our descriptions do not need to be eidetic and aspire to the articulation of 
laws, we are free to ask ourselves whether there are other virtues that we might value in our 
phenomenological methods. Bitbol and Petitmengin, for example, suggest that the validity of 
methods that value the first-person perspective (as phenomenological qualitative analysis does) 
should not be measured in terms of “truth,” if this notion is conceived as adequacy or 
representative accurateness. Instead, we might think of value “in terms of authenticity on the 
one hand, and of performative consistency” or coherence on the other (Bitbol & Petitmengin, 
2009, p. 373). I would add that the purpose of a phenomenological description is to convey the 
nuances of experience amongst interlocutors, and so qualities such as attention to salient 
details, vivacity, liveliness, and a propensity for disclosure are important (Williams, 2016).  
Zahavi criticizes qualitative research methods on the grounds that they are too 
descriptive. He notes that Smith’s IPA “seeks to provide rich experiential descriptions” but 
questions whether this or merely considering the first-person perspective are enough to secure 
“phenomenological credentials” (Zahavi, 2018, p. 900). Zahavi clearly thinks not, but what I 
find remarkable is that no actual arguments or reasons are given for this. He goes on to say that 
phenomenologically “informed qualitative research has different aims than phenomenological 
philosophy, but it is questionable whether the former can qualify as phenomenological if it 
either ignores or misinterprets the latter” (ibid).3 Yet, it is not the level of attention or adherence 
to the original theory of some field but a broad etymological relation and the sharing of genetic 
material which licenses the use of a term. There are many features of a science which might 
qualify a species to constitute a branch on the family tree, and, due to the examples provided 
and the reasons outlined hereabouts, it would seem to be that articulating descriptions of first-
person experience (even simple ones) is indeed a qualifying trait of phenomenology.  
Van Manen in turn claimed that Zahavi’s work lacks attention to descriptive detail and 
is overly philosophical and analytic (van Manen, 2019). This will come as a great surprise to 
professional philosophers who know Zahavi for his non-technical writing style and the clarity 
of his elucidations.4 However, van Manen asks a question which penetrates to the heart of the 
matter: “When is it too much argument and too little description? Too much technical 
systematizing philosophy and too little interpretive and expressive phenomenological 
disclosure of meaning?” (ibid, p. 8). This strikes me as a question without a criterion for an 
answer. The reason this question has no answer has to do with the fact that the meaning of 
cultural product terms like “phenomenology” is open to variation, change, and interpretation. 
In Husserlian idiom, these ends on the continuum between analysis and description represent 
limiting conditions which serve to differentiate species of a genus of meaning, but neither rules 
the other out as non-phenomenological. 
  
§5.4 From description to analysis 
  
Against Smith et al. (2009), Zahavi (2018, p. 2) casts doubt on heavily descriptive 
approaches when he expresses skepticism that what phenomenologists do is formalize 
 
3 At the end of this paper, we’ll see that I agree that misinterpretation of phenomenological philosophy is indeed 
a problem, but not one which disqualifies a research method form being phenomenological. I propose quite a 
different solution to misinterpretation than Zahavi.    
4 Zahavi is one of the most accessible expert Husserlian phenomenologists.  
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something we are all already doing (i.e., articulating experience). However, take the following 
passage: 
  
When I am watching a football match, I normally pay no attention to the turn of 
my head as I follow the motions of the players... When I am occupied with 
objects, my perceptual acts and their bodily roots are generally passed over in 
favor of the perceived, that is, my body tends to efface itself on its way to its 
intentional goal. (Zahavi, 2005, p. 205) 
 
The first sentence is a singular description of an experience. It conveys “what-it’s-like” 
(bodily) to watch a football match. The purpose of the first sentence is to illustrate a structural 
feature of embodiment (i.e., that embodiment is not normally the intentional object but the 
overlooked vehicle or medium of perception). The second sentence is more generalized and 
explicitly talks about the just mentioned “general” or structural feature which is present in all 
embodied experiences of this type; it is an eidetic description of the structures which were 
latent in the first sentence and it employs a more sophisticated and philosophically informed 
conceptual framework.  
This is a good example of the canonical phenomenological philosophical method. The 
descriptions I provided from Husserl and Sartre, for example, are embedded within lengthy 
eidetic analyses.5 For Husserl, singular descriptions only provide a focal point and serve the 
purpose of exemplification. Yet these descriptions certainly do provide us with a logos of 
experiential phenomena, and they satisfy the minimal condition of adhering to the so-called 
“principle-of-all-principles,”6 the gold standard of Husserlian phenomenology. So, is it right to 
say that the first parts of the passage from Zahavi lose their phenomenological status if 
unaccompanied by the final? It seems more productive and less dogmatic to say that there are 
different levels, phases, or even types of phenomenology.   
Sometimes, these phases are dispersed across different individuals. For example, you 
might read the rich descriptions contained in Sartre’s Nausea. You might then generalize 
(starting with yourself) to features of shared structure, precisely because it was a particularly 
lively and vivacious depiction. In the applied context, commonly singular descriptions are 
gathered via an interview. The qualitative researcher then analyzes the data in order to identify 
generalities such as “essential structure” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 6; 2012) or “emergent patterns (i.e., 
themes)” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 80). Whenever we have one person giving a description of their 
individual stream of consciousness and another person analyzing these descriptions for more 
general features, presumably across a diverse population of interviewees, we have a sharing of 
phenomenological tasks. This is an important difference in method,7 and crucial 
methodological questions arise.8 For now, though, the essential point is that to say that a 
 
5 This point should be well heeded. It would be misleading to think that phenomenological philosophy was largely 
composed of mundane descriptions like the ones I provided.   
6 As it is presented in Husserl (1983), the principle-of-all-principles is “that every originary presentive intuition 
is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originarily… offered to us in “intuition” is to be accepted 
simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there” (p. 44). The 
principle of all principles is the methodological edict that phenomenology ought to be arbitrated by an appeal to 
experience (that which is given in intuition).  
7 However, it is not so different from the philosophical context. Husserl might have both the experience and the 
eidetic or general insight based on it himself, but this insight will need to be shared or “reactivated” amongst other 
phenomenologists via a communicative act, firstly, and secondly an act of understanding on the reader’s behalf 
(see Williams, 2016). This highlights the importance of using lively and rich descriptive examples in the 
philosophical context. 
8 For example, Giorgi suggests that it is the researcher analyzing the data who needs to bracket their 
presuppositions (Giorgi, 2012). I would have thought it was just important that the interviewee who is providing 
the description do so. 
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research project becomes “phenomenological” at the eidetic or generalizing stage of research 
seems rather arbitrary. 
  
§6 Conclusion to part one 
 
The only important thing to do is to make sure we understand the features of each sense 
of the term “phenomenology.” We have distinguished a heavily eidetic, universal, and 
structural type of phenomenology from a more singular and everyday descriptive variety. As 
we have also seen, sometimes these different meanings of phenomenology operate in the same 
study. In cases however that they do not, they might be better characterized as different phases. 
Either way, we should not confuse them, because they present us with different strengths.  
Husserl employed the descriptive method because he thought that the mistake of 
philosophers who had come before him was that they failed to understand the experiential 
ground of certain concepts they relied on so heavily. He sought to unpack concepts like 
“consciousness” or “content” via a return to “the things themselves” as they exist and are 
experienced in the prescientific, intuitive, non-theoretical lifeworld from which these concepts 
receive their constitutive genesis.  
An example of this method is Husserl’s close descriptions of the relation between the 
lived and material body in works like Ideas 2 (Husserl, 1989). Husserl’s descriptions show that 
Descartes’ analysis of the concepts of “mind” and “body” in his famous Meditations (2008) 
does not stick closely enough to the intuitive data of the way the psychically ensouled lived 
body is experientially intertwined with and not divorced from our own material body. This 
description amounts to a reorganization and relativization of Cartesian duality. This obviously 
carries huge philosophical implications. Thus, what close but singular descriptions do is 
provide a type of evidence which allow us to avoid the pitfalls of dogmatic theoretical 
presuppositions imposing themselves on our philosophizing. I will later demonstrate the 
analogy between this role that descriptions of experience play in a philosophical context and 
the contemporary qualitative context.  
But of course, there are disadvantages to approaches which rely too heavily on the 
description of simple experience. Firstly, singular descriptions are open to charges that what is 
described is merely an idiosyncratic feature of the describers mental or conscious life. Until 
researchers begin to generalize to shared or structural features of experience, it is hard to know 
whether we are dealing with something general and therefore important, or something 
eccentric. Notice, in this regard, the tendency to interpret the surreal experiences in Nausea not 
by reference to a loss of meaning which characterizes the human condition but by a bad 
mescaline trip that Sartre experienced as a young man (e.g., in Valjak, 2017).9  
Moreover, singular descriptions are open to the charge that any sort of method which 
relies on first-person reports is unreliable, as people are not in fact very good at determining 
their own cognitive states (Nisbett & Bellows, 1977; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), nor very good 
at determining what is in their perceptual field (Levin & Simons, 1997; Simons & Chabris, 
1999), nor are we in fact even able to accurately self-report what we experience and are 
conscious of (Block, 1995; Bornstein & Pittman, 1992). Such charges can partly be responded 
to be the employment of new criterion for measuring the success of descriptions (i.e., those 
suggested by Bitbol & Petitmengin, 2009), but a generalizing analysis confers a different sort 
of academic weight (Williams, 2020). The takeaway point, however, is that there is a dialectic 
within phenomenology between singularity and generality; description and analysis; the 
subjective and the objective. These make up phases, moments, or movements of a project which 
can broadly be called “phenomenological.”  
 
9  This explanation was in fact partly offered by Sartre himself (Gerassi, 2009).  
Heath Williams                                     377 
   §7 Part two. An assessment of van Manen VS Zahavi VS Smith 
 
One of the criterion van Manen invokes for defining “phenomenology” is resemblance 
or adherence to primary philosophical literature. Smith’s method, he contends, “does not 
resemble any of the phenomenologies that are to be found in the primary literature, tradition, 
and movements” (van Manen, 2018, p. 1966) and it therefore should not be considered 
phenomenological. (This raises the thorny problem of how to decide what constitutes “primary 
literature, tradition, and movements.” Van Manen’s definition seems much wider than 
Zahavi’s, for example). Zahavi sided with van Manen on this issue, though, claiming that the 
link between Smith’s method and “philosophical phenomenology is so tenuous, that anybody 
practicing it, can only be said to be engaged in phenomenological research in the most 
superficial sense of the term” (Zahavi, 2019, p. 2). Morley claims that “IPA is 
phenomenological in ‘name only’ with limited relation to the actual phenomenological 
tradition” (Morley, 2019, p. 165).  
These criticisms, however, do not appear to hit the mark they intend. Smith may not be 
engaged in phenomenological research in the originary sense of the term, yet, as he correctly 
points out, “philosophy does not own phenomenology” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 34). Indeed, no 
one does, or can, because of the nature of cultural objects. What constitutes a science is always 
open to revision by the next generation of practitioners, and so it is difficult to see how the 
claim to break with tradition, by itself, is supposed to constitute an objection.  
van Manen’s motivation for attempting to restrict the use of the term phenomenology 
is because he thinks that too wide a definition damages “the larger project of phenomenology 
in relation to professional practices in fields such as psychology, health science, education, and 
pedagogy” (van Manen 2018, p. 1966). I find this motivation most curious. The other 
professional practices whose opinion he worries about could themselves hardly be called 
homogenous. Psychology, for example, comes in qualitative, Freudian, cognitive, humanistic, 
phenomenological, developmental, clinical, counselling, neurological, and abnormal varieties, 
to name just a few distinctions. All broadly qualify for the title because they develop a “logos” 
of the “psyche,” but each probably have different conceptions of both terms. A Freudian 
psychoanalyst will probably stress that they mean something slightly different in calling 
themselves a “psychologist” than the cognitive psychologist does. Moreover, it would be 
absurd to criticize any of them on the grounds that they do not adhere strictly to the methods 
and theories of Freud, Wundt, Fechner or any of the other fathers of psychology and their 
“primary literature.”  
Although Zahavi agrees with van Manen’s assessment of Smith, he criticizes van 
Manen for associating phenomenology with the “what-it’s-like” renditions of phenomenology 
which, as we have seen (though associable with Continental phenomenology), essentially arise 
from the analytic tradition. As Zahavi shows, van Manen himself does not, on this score, do 
justice to the eidetic or philosophic aspirations of Continental phenomenology which he 
portends to represent, and Zahavi’s criticisms thus reveal an inconsistency. Yet still, 
inconsistency does not demonstrate that the method van Manen proposes is un-
phenomenological. Despite what van Manen himself thinks, it is not adherence to tradition that 
grants one the right to use a name; if this were true, the natural scientists of today would be as 
blindly accepting of Aristotle’s theory of causation as the Scholastics.  
 
§8 Zahavi on qualitative research 
 
In closing, I will assess Zahavi’s recent recommendations to qualitative researchers. 
The focus up until this point in this article is the right to call a movement by a title. My central 
point is that a science is not defined or evaluated by its adherence to tradition. However, I do 
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not mean to imply that all variants of a scientific movement are on equal footing. The new is 
not even necessarily better than the old. For example, even though I have just argued that van 
Manen’s theory qualifies as phenomenological, I also think that Zahavi offers some detailed 
criticisms of this theory that are particularly adroit (2019).   
One of the strengths of Zahavi’s recent analysis of qualitative research methods was his 
reasoned arguments about the need to develop more philosophically informed semi-structured 
interview tools or intervention practices that directly draw from the rich pre-extant body of 
phenomenological insight in the right circumstances. For example, he points to previous tools 
developed in close interaction with phenomenological theory in the field of clinical 
neuropsychiatry that allow the clinician to measure a patient’s sense of self-awareness along a 
variety of axes (Zahavi & Martiny, 2019). There is a lot of canonical phenomenological work 
on the structural features of our sense of ipseity. Thus, a strength of this analysis is its reasoned 
match between the phenomenological theorical standpoint and contextual demand determining 
a particular methodology and method, and I concur with much of what Zahavi and Martiny 
have to say. In this final section, my focus is to offer a similar but divergent argument about a 
particular circumstance where some of the methods Zahavi criticizes are appropriate.  
Zahavi (2019) and Zahavi and Martiny (2019) critique Giorgi’s (2009) approach as 
applied in the work of Beck (2013), as well as Wood’s (1991) approach, on the grounds that 
they utilize an open technique method to interviewing that has a methodology of minimising 
intervention.  
 
To adopt a hands-off approach, where one simply asks the patient to describe 
his or her experiences and then sits back and listens, is clearly not the right 
way… it is all about conducting the interview in light of quite specific ideas and 
notions, notions taken from phenomenological theory. To conduct a 
phenomenological interview is consequently not simply a question of being 
open-minded and interested in first-person experience. It is very much also 
about adopting and employing a comprehensive theoretical framework that will 
allow one to ask the right questions (Zahavi, 2019, p. 6, my italics). 
   
As Morley’s response makes clear (2019), many of the qualitative researchers Zahavi criticizes 
for their passivity are more active than he and Martiny portray them as.  
My response is somewhat different, though. What these criticisms neglect is the 
methodological virtues that qualitative researchers attempt to import from the theoretical 
motivations that drove Husserl to employ the methodology of presuppositionless description 
of experience (which strikes me as much a bona fide genetic trait of phenomenology as any so 
far discussed), and it is this virtue that open-minded questioning and non-structured 
interviewing methods attempt to instill.  
As Churchill and Wertz (2015) note, the “nature and handling of various kinds of 
‘presuppositions’ have been the topic of extensive discussion and debate among 
phenomenologists” (Churchill & Wertz, 2015, p. 281). Giorgi utilizes the reduction because he 
thinks it implies that we “refrain from bringing in past knowledge” (2012, p. 4). Similarly, 
Mapp suggests that bracketing involves “the suspension of the researcher’s own 
preconceptions, beliefs or prejudices so that they do not influence the interpretation of the 
respondents’ experience,” and that the Husserlian approach “requires the researcher to put aside 
her preconceived ideas regarding the subject of the interview prior to data collection” (2008, 
p. 308 & 309).10 Tuffour states that the phenomenological attitude requires us to “put aside past 
 
10 It should be noted, I do not actually think that the idea of presuppositionless description should be associated 
with bracketing, the epoche, or the reductions without much greater discussion and analysis. I just want to point 
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knowledge or presuppositions” (2017, p. 53). Smith et al., finally, makes the connection in 
question explicit when they state that “Husserl famously urged phenomenologists to go ‘back 
to the things themselves,’ and IPA research follows his lead in this regard, rather than 
attempting to fix experience in predefined… categories” (2009, p. 7). 
As previously indicated, Husserl thought that stripping away preconceived ideas (or, 
dogmatically held philosophical theses) was a crucial aspect of phenomenological 
methodology. So, let me be explicit here: the analogy in question is between suspending 
entrenched philosophical theses for the purpose of giving an accurate description of experience 
which allows us to formulate a more robust philosophical account on the one hand, and on the 
other, suspending our dogmatic or biased and prejudicial beliefs for the purpose of giving a 
more accurate qualitative account of experience, perhaps the experience of previously 
marginalized populations. This is one of the shared genetic traits that underwrites certain 
schools of qualitative research calling themselves “phenomenological.”    
Zahavi, on the other hand, contends that it is by no means a methodological prerequisite 
for doing phenomenological research “that one initially strips one’s own mind of preconceived 
ideas” (Zahavi, 2019, p. 6). He might be right that it is not a necessary condition of 
phenomenology, but the value of this methodological proposal very much depends on which 
ideas. If one is operating, for example, with a sharply naturalistic, strictly non-psycho/social 
biological model of patient care (such as has historically predominated in some health care 
settings), that is, if one is living in what Husserl (1989) termed the purely “naturalistic attitude,” 
which takes a naïve stance towards the importance of experience, then one might indeed be 
well served by stripping away these ideas, because they filter phenomenologically salient 
categories and thus prohibit insight.  
There is a broader point to be made here as well. There is something of a disjoint 
between the concerns of the progenitors of the originary philosophical theoretical standpoint 
of phenomenology and the aims which motivate the methodology of many contemporary 
qualitative researchers. The overwhelming majority of phenomenological philosophers were 
white, upper-class, Judeo-Christian, European males living in the first half of the twentieth 
century. Hardly a cohort known for their receptivity to the concerns of many contemporary 
qualitative researchers. A noteworthy absence from the canon is discussions of class, race, 
sexuality, or gender. On the other hand, qualitative phenomenological research has been found 
to be particularly suited to describing these types of experiences. For example, there are a 
variety of studies on women’s and parenting experiences: feelings and fears during obstetric 
emergencies (Mapp & Hudson, 2005), women’s expectations and experiences of childbirth 
(Gibbins & Thomson, 2001), pain during childbirth (Lundgren & Dahlberg, 1998), and the 
experience of fathers breaking down from PTSD following the birth of their child (White, 
2007). 
It has also been applied to topics as diverse as women’s experience of inorgasmia 
(Lavie & Willig, 2005), how ex-offenders in Asian cultures experience the process of 
desistance (Adorjan & Chui, 2011), transgender individuals experience of the transition process 
(Paralik, 2017), how gay men of color experienced gay-specific racism (Giwa, 2016), and how 
HIV-positive gay men think about sexual relationships (Smith et al., 2009). The latter analysis 
revealed relational structures such as that sexually risky behavior was a form of giving of 
oneself as a gift, with the aim of becoming closer and more intimate, and a power dynamic. 
There is little to nothing on these sorts of topics in the canonical phenomenological literature, 
which just doesn’t approach the structures of the kinds of experiences described. Moreover, 
given the tendency of implicit biases towards race, gender, sexuality, criminality, etc., there is 
 
out that qualitative researchers were inspired by the former notion, which some of them then identify with more 
technical Husserlian apparatuses.    
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probably even a good reason to begin these studies with a limited amount of traditional 
phenomenological theoretical background.11     
These are good reasons why contemporary researchers sometimes look to engage in 
“pure” research which explores new phenomenological dimensions, distinctions, and 
categories. Zahavi goes some way towards acknowledging as much, stating that “by attending 
to specific aspects or dimensions that the phenomenological philosophers might have 
overlooked, [qualitative researchers] can also contribute to theory development, and help refine 
the phenomenological analyses and distinctions” (Zahavi, 2019, p. 7). Yet, one study Zahavi 
endorses ends by challenging a core phenomenological categorisation schema, that is, the 
fundamentality of the distinction between lived and objective body and calls for a 
reconsideration of “the prejudiced critique of the ‘body as object’ in mainstream 
phenomenology” (Slatman, Halsema, & Meershoek, 2016, p. 1). Thus, not only will the 
uncovering of new experiential dimensions often require us to suspend and go beyond the 
traditional categories employed by phenomenologists, these categories may not need to be 
refined but overturned or redefined all together, and in this context a purer, more open, and less 
interventionist descriptive method seems more appropriate.  
What presuppositionless description aims for is the establishment of new theoretical 
distinctions which increase the color palate of the lifeworld. It is difficult to allow such fresh 
categories emerge if we are directing interviewees along well-trodden theoretical paths. “An 
open-ended contact with everyday life is thus preferred over experiments or questionnaires, 
which often manifest biases unreflected on by the researcher” (Churchill & Wertz, 2015, p. 
282). 
 
The very raison d’etre of the “so called” unstructured interview is to avoid the mistake 
made by designers of questionnaires which pre-frame the categorical structures of the 
phenomena before the interviewee even speaks. Phenomenological interviewers prefer, 
as much as reasonable, to take a “discovery” approach to interviewing (Morley, 2019, 
p. 165). 
 
In summary, on the one hand, Zahavi calls for a greater engagement and employment 
of phenomenological theory using interview methods which are structured by the theoretical 
viewpoint engendered by traditional phenomenological categories, and he attempts to do 
justice the mutual enlightenment thesis. He even urges nursing researchers merely to consider 
phenomenology as “an open-minded attitude” (Zahavi, 2019, p. 8). Yet, it is precisely the way 
this open-minded attitude manifests in existent phenomenological methods that he criticizes on 
the other hand, scuttling research methods which advocate for pure description and are 
explicitly designed to break free from pre-established theoretical molds. I think a minor 
adjustment is to allow that some contexts should neglect or suspend the traditional 
phenomenological theoretical standpoint and will call for a purer descriptive methodology, 
involving less structured interview methods. Importantly though, neither one of these methods 
is more “phenomenological” than the other. 
 
§9 Conclusion to part 2 
  
I agree with Zahavi that the level of philosophical scholarship that is present amongst 
qualitative research is sometimes quite poor. Mapp’s (2008) article, for example, which 
portends to provide a basic introduction to phenomenological methodology, actually manages 
 
11 There may be other, more appropriate, theoretical backgrounds, that is, queer or critical race theory, or 
perhaps even the newly developed critical phenomenological theory.  
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to misspell Husserl’s name! I commiserate with qualitative researchers, though. 
Phenomenological philosophy is a daunting and at times impenetrable field, and this is because 
much of the corpus is overly technical and obscure. A guilty secret amongst Husserlians is that 
he was often inconsistent and unclear, and even we do not know what he meant much more 
often that we like to admit. I sincerely hope that qualitative researchers engage more with 
phenomenology, or philosophy of any sort, but it takes as much time to become an expert 
Husserlian as it does to become an expert psychotherapist, educator, or nurse. As may have 
become clear in the opening sections of this article, qualitative research and phenomenological 
philosophy (once understood) are at times antithetical and strange bedfellows. So, feel free to 
move beyond traditional phenomenology.  
It is, of course, not that anyone is prohibited from adopting a philosophical 
phenomenological theoretical standpoint or methodology, it is just that one does not need to. 
Both standpoint and methodology (not to mention the actual methods, such as the epoche and 
reduction) are fraught with difficulties and may not even be appropriate. Morley states that the 
suggestion that “researchers give up applying the epoche and reductions is essentially the same 
as saying that they should abandon doing purely phenomenological qualitative research” 
(Morley, 2019, p. 166). I just do not understand what the invocation or “purity” is here 
supposed to achieve; as if Husserl is some sort of methodological unicorn. Crotty laments the 
disconnect between the original spirit of phenomenological philosophy and qualitative 
research, but as he somberly admits, there just “is no place here for any kind of purism or the 
mounting of a defence of some alleged orthodoxy” (Crotty, 1998, p. 84).  
I lament not. The spirit of radical critique that Crotty mourns is alive and well, and it is 
well served by the observation that there is no need to aim for methodological or theoretical 
purity. Both Giorgi and van Manen’s mistake is the claim of methodological authenticity when, 
in fact, they are not always representative of philosophical phenomenology. Methods such as 
the epoche and the reductions have borne more confusion than they have fruit in any context. 
I would thus advise against importing your methodological vocabulary from the likes of 
Husserl and Heidegger. Finally, stop trying to accuse one another of inauthenticity. This last is 
a pernicious hubristic habit. 
Conversely, qualitative research already provides high-level, original accounts of 
experience. Indeed, it is more than possible that qualitative approaches to phenomenology will 
provide a more powerful and comprehensive science of lived experience than philosophy ever 
could, and that it will in the end become the dominant form of the science (at which stage, I 
am sure qualitative researchers will start claiming that philosophical phenomenologists are not 
“genuine” phenomenologists, if they are not already!) 
Many philosophical concepts cannot be used in qualitative research without losing their 
identity altogether. Thus, we have to accept that the phenomenological notions qualitative 
researchers develop are something new produced for the sake of the research. So, why not just 
redefine terms? One might just reasonably say, “the idea of bracketing” or “epoche” arose in a 
philosophical context, perhaps provide a very short definition from a leading expert on 
Husserl’s methodology, but then say: “however, we mean something slightly different by that 
term here” or even “we are using a different method altogether in order to study experience.” 
Then give your own definition. My contribution is to say that, in doing this, qualitative 
researchers are not voiding their right to call their method “phenomenological.” And the reason 
for this has nothing to do with anything inside of phenomenological theory but because of the 
far broader considerations about the ways that language and the “meaning” of the terms which 
denote a science function.  
An author who gets the tone right is Smith and his co-authors, who envisage “a mature, 
multi-faceted and holistic phenomenology” which does not seek to “operationalize or privilege 
one particular phenomenology or phenomenological theorist,” and instead admits that “IPA is 
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influenced by the core emphases of the approach, and by a number of further elements drawn 
from the different positions” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 35). Smith thus takes broad inspiration but 
gladly (and explicitly) breaks tradition on the specifics. There is no need to say, “I’m using the 
same method as Edmond [sic] Husserl,” because you are almost certainly not, there probably 
wouldn’t be any point in doing so, and the truth is you just do not need to. Each new branch of 
science has the right to reenvisage the method on its own terms often dependent on more 
overarching theoretical considerations. Failure to make all this explicit, however, risks the 
equivocality that is causing real problems in the contemporary context. 
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